ULAMAS AND HIS INFLUENCE ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION : THE ROLE OF HETEROGENEITY IN COMMUNITIES STRUCTURE

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Abstract

This paper examines some concepts regarding religion and conflict, more specifically, the role of Islamic religious leaders in the conflict resolution. In many Muslim countries, Islamic religious leaders play significant roles, not only in the religious realm, but also in the social, cultural, and even political realm. In contrast, the social environment will also determine the level of quality of religious leader's influence in the form of obedience from citizens over the handling of (resolution) social problems in general and specifically conflict. In the heterogeneous socio-economic structure community realizing those are becoming a major challenge. This article examines the relationship between socio-economic structure of the community with the conflict resolution through the role of the local informal leader, in this case religious leaders (ulama). Data analysis was performed using a combination of SUSENAS and PODES provided by BPS, the unit of analysis based communities around 70,000 villages which aggregated at about 480 districts/cities level of 33 provinces in Indonesia in 2011. At initial stage, we creating specific ulama's quality measurement, named Indek Kualitas Pengaruh Ulama. Then, because of abundance of zero conflict cases and data overdispersion, we analyze this index relation with socio-economic communities structure through ZIP (Zero-Inflated Poisson) regression. This study found that "stable" socio-economic structure of the communities are determine the ulama's quality. On the one hand, worsening community social cohesion represented by the high polarization index, tend to erode the ulama's role (influence) especially in resolving conflict. Conversely, a low polarization index, boosted the confidence level (general trust) to the role of ulama.

Keywords: Informal Leadership, Community Structure, Conflict Resolution, Ulama Influence

INTRODUCTION

Religious leaders (Ulama) is an informal figures who played an important role in various aspects of life of Muslims since the first. In addition to the role as a religious mentor for the citizens, religious leaders also serve as a solution to the socio-economic problems and so on. Many posts were already discussing how to type and tidal influence of the religious leader's role in the long history of the nation. Therefore, this paper tries to limit itself to the role of the contemporary scholars in addressing socio-economic issues of cutting-edge at the local level. One is the social conflict Which is currently of concern to various parties.

This issue becomes important, because at this time the influence of the religious leader's role was facing a major challenge with various complexity, dynamics and recency problem. This indirectly will determine the quality of his influence in the eyes of citizens (the ummah). In contrast to the formal leader who gained influence of authority and power derived, informal leaders receive from the trust (trust)

resident will be the capacity of leadership. This trust makes people want to follow his orders to do and not do something voluntarily on behalf of the joint (common good).

But doing so is not easy. In the heterogeneous socio-economic structure community, realizing it is becoming a big challenge. Residents will have the will to supply of or intervene for the common good if they share a mutual trust and solidarity (Ostrom, 2000). This means that if the residents, who live in the region, trust each other and are ready to help and reply, they would be willing to intervene, even in case of danger or unpleasant situations and emergencies.

There is a general consensus that trust is an important requirement for performance efficiency for every kind institution at local and national level in broader term. Not surprisingly, many social scientists trying to understand the determinants of trust and why it varies greatly across countries (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). Most of this research has focused on the relationship between trust and heterogeneity (and other sizes of heterogeneity as fractionalization on ethnicity, religion or income) and reached the general conclusion that there is a strong negative correlation between heterogeneity (or inequality) to common belief (general trust).

According to the literature, the correlation is driven by three main factors. First, the principle of homophily (Mc Pherson et al., 2001) and resistance to heterogeneity (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). From this perspective, economic inequality is a source of diversity and socio-economic distance: the higher the degree of economic inequality, the higher the "social barriers" between different groups and individuals will feel less familiar with and connect to other people. This, in turn, inhibits the formation of trust.

Secondly, with regard to the concept of justice. Heterogeneity or precisely inequality can produce a perception of injustice and the belief that other people have unfair advantages, thus inhibiting the development of trust in others. The third refers to the hypothesis of a resource conflict. That is, people who are unbalanced, may not agree on how to share (and pay for) public goods (public goods). This conflict, in turn, break down social ties and reduces the formation of trust and social cohesion (Delhey and Newton, 2005).

Coupled with the variety of characteristics of the population living in urban and rural areas, as well as working in various sectors, Indonesia has completed as a heterogenizing nation-state. On the one hand, the diversity is an valuable asset, but on the other hand, it may be a potential drivers of increases in inequality and polarization which may lead to social conflict. Barron et al. (2004) contended that the existence of various ethnic, religious, and/or linguistic groups could enhance the likelihood of conflict. In line with this, Easterly and Levine (1997) suggested that the presence of multiple ethnic groups had often been associated with lower growth and a higher probability of conflict or even civil war.

This article examines the relationship between socio-economic structure of the community with the conflict resolution through the role of the informal character, in this case

religious leaders (ulama). The main purpose of the paper is to bring these theoretical predictions to the data at the Indonesian macro level (city/district). This study is expected to explain the role of informal leaders especially religious leaders in overcoming conflicts; related types of conflicts that can be resolved, the factors that determine variations in the quality of the role of the religious leaders as well as map out the area where he still play a role in this context.

LITERATURE REVIEW

As other informal leaders, the role of the clergy and the quality of the effect is not formed in a vacuum chambers. Leaders require followers, no leaders without followers. Relationships between leaders and followers should be a two-way relationship that is formed through a series of long process. In general, this also applies in relations between religious leaders and his followers people. How is the process run and what factors affect the adherents of citizens will trust and follow their religious leaders?.

Religious Identity

The construction of religious identity through its embodied beliefs and rituals can also be viewed from Bourdieu's *theory of practice*. Theory of practice tries to bridge the dichotomy between agents and structures, objectivity and subjectivity, individual and social. For Bourdieu, "theory of practice is the precondition for establishing an experimental science of the *dialectic of the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality,* or, more simply, of incorporation and objectification (Bourdieu, 1977:72).

Echoing Marx's ideas, the theory of practice as practice insists, against positivist materialism, that the objects of knowledge are constructed, and against idealist intellectualism, that the principle of this construction is practical activity oriented towards practical functions.

There are three interrelated concepts in Bourdieu's theory of practice: *habitus, capital* and *field*. The first concept, *habitus,* is "the generative principle of the objectively classifiable judgments and the systems of classification" (Bourdieu, 1984:170). Habitus is the ability to produce classifiable practices and works, and the capacity to differentiate and appreciate these practices and products. It is necessity internalized and converted into a disposition that generates meaningful practices and meaning-giving perceptions (Bourdieu, 1984:170). Habitus, for Bourdieu, is not only organizes practices and perception of practices, but also organizes the perception of the social world which is itself the product of internalization of the division into social classes (Bourdieu, 1984:170). One of the fundamental effects of the orchestration of habitus is "the production of a commonsense world endowed with the objectivity secured by consensus on the meaning of practices and the world" (Bourdieu, 1977: 80).

The second concept is *capital*, which goes beyond the notion of Marx's material assets to capital. The term of cultural capital refers to non-financial social assets that promote social mobility beyond economic means. These can include education, intellect, styles of speech, dress, and even physical appearance. The third

concept is *field*. Bourdieu shared Weber's view, contrary to traditional Marxism, that society cannot be analyzed simply in terms of economic classes and ideologies. Instead of analyzing societies in terms of classes, Bourdieu uses the concept of field: "the various social and institutional arenas in which people express and reproduce their dispositions, and where they compete for the distribution of different kinds of capital" (Bourdieu, 1977:95,). A field is a network, structure or set of relationships which may be intellectual, religious, educational, or cultural. The position of each particular agent in the field is thus a result of interaction between the specific rules of the field, agent's habitus and agent's capital (social, economic and cultural).

By utilizing Bourdieu's theoretical framework of the theory of practice, it is possible to read that the construction of identity among Muslims is closely related to the 'practices' of Islamic individuals in terms of his or her habitus, capital, and field. It means that the dynamic strategies of relationships among different habitus of individuals Muslims, the capitals owned by individuals Muslims, and the fields of specific Islamic beliefs and ritual practices will be very influential in the formation of different Muslim identities.

In short, according to Bourdieu's theory, the success of leader-follower relationship also driven by the principle of homophily (McPherson et al., 2001) and resistance to heterogeneity (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). From this perspective, every type of heterogeneity especially in worsen form as

inequality is a source of diversity and socio-economic distance: the higher the degree of heterogeneity (inequality), the higher the "social barriers" between different groups and individuals will feel less familiar with and connect to other people. This, in turn, inhibits the formation of trust.

Trust and Leadership

In terms of management, transformational leaders (James McGregor Burns, 1978) used to classify people who are willing and able to motivate others to join the movement to a certain standard and vice versa inspire his followers. It becomes a challenge to the notion that rational considerations as the only motivation to engage in acts of social control. Therefore, individuals may also be driven by social incentives include keeping their reputation or the interests of altruistic. Furthermore, leader attention to the interests and needs of followers is essential to achieve effective leadership. In the political realm, Burns said that "only the followers themselves can ultimately define their own true needs … [given] an informed choice" (1978:36).

From the outset, followers perceive and respond to a leader's qualities, including his or her recognized legitimacy, as well as motivation, and performance. In this vein, Gary Wills stated that "Followers judge leaders. Only if the leaders pass that test do they have any impact" (1994, p. 21). Although his latter point may not prevail in the face of someone in a determining position of authority, Wills says in his conclusion that "so much of leadership is the projection of an image that will appeal

to followers" (p. 274). Therefore, "reality" is projected by a leader through perceptual manipulation (Gray & Densten, 2007). The aphorism "An ounce of image is worth a pound of performance" may not be taken literally, but such perceptions by followers can obscure their awareness of actual deficiencies in a leader's performance. However, perception guides behavior, influenced by motivation. Changes can occur in perception, when enriched by experience. The prospect for trust or mistrust may thereby grow. If positive, there will likely be loyalty and solidarity of purpose and the reverse is also likely. Trust and loyalty are among those qualities needed to bind relationships.

METHODOLOGY

Although many theory above describe also about the successful leaders characteristics, this study will not explored in that context. Specifically, this study will examine the part of relationship between the role of structure (identity) of local community such as socioeconomic heterogeneity; ethnic and income, demographics such as the number of children in the household, households headed by female, toward the quality of ulama as their informal leader. So, from there we could answer the question when will the ulama get his follower obedience and in what kind of community from he will get it.

Data and Variables

Our dependent variable is religious leader role (quality) in resolving conflict, togarate. At meanwhile, out main independent variable is heterogeneity ; including polarization and inequality of income. This study combines individual-level data on the income aspect SUSENAS (Survey Sosial Ekonomi Nasional) module 2011 and data which proxied the role of informal leader at the level of villages using of PODES (Potensi Desa) 2011 and various other national resepresentasi of data. PODES questionnaire has variables that can be used as a proxy of this case, namely, variable r1302a about the mass brawl that could be reconciled. So in this case there are two types of villages, which are in the village ;

1 = mass brawl can be reconciled

0 = mass brawl could not be reconciled

Furthermore, there is a variable r1302b, which contains questions about the role of each character in reconciling a mass brawl, ranging from the security forces, government apparatus, religious leaders, community leaders and so on. In this case, it just would have been the answer if 8, means that only analyze the role of religious leaders (named variable as toga). Otherwise, if the answer is 4, means that only analyze the role of community leaders (named variable as toma)

toga

1 = if r1302a*r1302b==8, meaning the mass brawl could be reconciled by 8 (relig' lead)

0 = others

toma

1 = if r1302a*r1302b==4, meaning the mass brawl could be reconciled by 4 (comm'lead)

0 = others

So where in the village a mass brawl could be reconciled by the two figures, either alone or both by them are considered to have the influence on local community. Then, we propose some *control variables* which create from the data of the village with unique characteristics which aggregated to the city/district level. There are residential mobility, which suspected to affect conflict indirectly by interfering with social networks and relationships (Sampson & Groves, 1989), weakening the capacity of local organizations (Wilson, 1996) and slow assimilation of new members (Janowitz, 1974). Sampson (1987) and Wilson (1987) agree that family interference affects the level of conflict with the weakening of the family's ability to supervise the younger members.

Family disruption refers to the phenomenon of households headed by a single parent - usually women, including the head of the household who are divorced, widowed or separated (Sampson & Groves, 1989). It is strongly associated with juvenile delinquency and adult social disorder behavior both among household white majority and minority (Sampson & Wilson, 1995). Finally, Sampson and Groves (1989) argues that urbanization can influence conflict by weakening the ties of friendship and kinship networks and local participation.

Table 1. Village Characteristics Aggregation at City/District level

Village (PODES)	Ratio at City/district level	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Religous leaders resolving conflict (1=Yes; 0=No)	togarate	386	6.259	63.112	0	1162.117
There are actively social inst (1=Yes; 0=No)	lemsos	420	0.016	0.0278	0.0001	0.16
There are actively community insf (1=Yes; 0=No)	lemasy	486	0.039	0.0482	0.0002	0.35
There are village representative body(1=Yes; 0=No)	bpd	173	0.002	0.003	0.0005	0.014
There are mass brawl in >2 ethnic village (1=Yes; 0=No) idak)	konf	492	0.685	1.475	0	14
City/district(SUSENAS)						
gini2011	gini	502	0.326	0.048	0.184	0.478
gini2010	gini2010	502	0.284	0.045	0.187	0.461
Polarisation income 2011	polarisasi	478	0.287	0.069	0.093	0.552
Rerata pengeluaran per kapita (mean_ln) RT	lnmeaninc	502	13.28	0.328	12.19	14.26
Ratio of Population age 0-7 y.o	anak	502	0.005	0.005	0.0005	0.072
Ratio population live in urban	Urbrate	478	0.398	0.316	0.008	1
Ratio household headed by female	femalehh	502	0.126	0.044	0.009	0.27
Ratio household with own-home	rumah	502	0.668	0.137	0.22	0.991
Village located in Java island (1=Yes; 0 =No)	Jawa	502	0.434	0.496	0	1
Village mean income>median income (1=Yes; 0 =No)	Kaya	502	0.645	0.479	0	1

Sorces : Authors' calculation from PODES and SUSENAS 2011

Meanwhile, it also included the variable availability of social and civic institutions. Local participation in formal and voluntary organizations arguably supplied the community with solidarity, institutional stability and increased capacity to control youth (Hunter, 1974; Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw & McKay, 1969 in Sampson & Groves, 1989, 778-779).

This institutional variables are also considered important for analysis to determine the source whence the influence of communities religious leaders came from. If assumed that informal figure is identical to the existence of similar institutions, then their success in leading or managing this agency be a proxy of the source of their influence.

Then all of this data peroxide the variables aggregated to the level of city/district according to the purpose and scope of the study. The process of aggregation is done in three (3) phases. First, add the data at the individual and household levels, both in numerical and binary, into the city/district level. Second, followed by making the proportion (ratio) by dividing this figure by the number of village in the city/district level. Third, followed by making the proportion (ratio) of population by dividing village's population by total population in the city/district level.

Creating Informal Influence Quality Index

To measure (quality of) the influence of the informal leaders at the level of city/district, we created the index, named *the (quality of) influence of informal leaders index*. This Index value will be influenced by the ratio of total incidence and the ratio of the population in the area where the conflict can be reconciled by each informal leaders.

(quality of) influence of religious leaders index per 10.000 population

$$togatare_{iv} = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{pop\_toga_{iv}}{tot\_pop_{v}} \right) * 10.000$$

Where $i = village$ and $v = city / district$ So, $toga_{iv}$ stated in the villages i in the city/district v, religious leaders managed to reconcile the conflict. Meanwhile pop_toga_{iv} state the number of population in where religious leaders (community leaders) managed to reconcile the conflict and tot_pop_{v} expressed total population residing in the city/district.

By multiplying with the number 10,000, then this index by itself would have a value in the range 0-10,0000. So in this case, we assume that the city/district with an index value of 10,000 as city/district that had an informal character with the highest influence (quality of). That is, if the index whose by a city/district worth 500 then it can be said the role of the clergy was to be recognized by each of 500 per 10,000 population in the city/district.

Furthermore, suppose a city/disrict have the total population of 1 million people, the scholars will affect the (1,000,000 / 10,000) * 500 inhabitants, ie 50,000 inhabitants. In this context, more and more of the population became followers of religious leaders (community leaders), it can be said that the more the quality of the religious leaders. Conversely, the lower the index value, closer to 0, the lower the quality of informal leaders at the level of city/disrict .

In this case it is considered that the variation level "quality" religious leaders in a city/district can be measured in real terms taking into account variations in the population amount at the level of city/district. This performance variables are used because we do not have the data quantity (nominal amount) of each informal leaders in each village explicitly.

By using these variables, then we can judge fairly because we have eliminated the impact of number of population variations on the quality of religious leadersl influence. So, we can say that the city/district "A", whose more population will have the same informal leader's quality level with city/district "B", whose smaller population if the index have the same worth for both cities.

Estimation Strategic

Real-life count data are frequently characterized by over dispersion and excess zeros. The *rare events* nature of conflict counts are controlled for in the formulas of both Poisson and Negative Binomial regression. However, Poisson and Negative Binomial regression models differ in regards to their assumptions of the conditional mean and variance of the dependent variable. Poisson models assume that the conditional mean and variance of the distribution are equal (*equidispersion*). Negative binomial regression models do not assume an equal mean and variance and particularly correct for *over dispersion* in the data, which is when the variance is greater than the conditional mean. When the over dispersion occurs, the Poisson regression is not appropriate to be used, because

although it generates consistent estimators of regression parameters, but it may produce biased estimator of the standard deviation.

Graph 1. Histogram of index toga Variable
Sorces : Authors' calculation from PODES 2011

So, Zero-inflated count models provide a parsimonious yet powerful way to model this type of situation. The main motivation for zero-inflated count models is that real-life data frequently display over dispersion and excess zeros (Greene 1994). Zero-inflated count models provide a way of modeling the excess zeros in addition to allowing for over dispersion.

Zero-inflated poison (ZIP) regression is used to model count data that has an excess of zero counts. Such models assume that the data are a mixture of two separate data generation processes: one generates only zeros, and the other is either a Poisson or a negative binomial data-generating process.

Further, theory suggests that the excess zeros are generated by a separate process from the count values and that the excess zeros can be modeled independently. Thus, the zip model has two parts, a poisson count model and the logit model for predicting excess zeros.

In the describing data, the response variable describing the abundance zero (0) cases of incidence of conflict over the village. To overcome this problem, ZIP regression will be employed. From graph 1, we conclude that our data suffer for excess zero and over dispersion. Then, model that we propose is.

$$togarate_{iv} = \alpha X_{iv} + \beta H_{iv} + \delta G_v + \varepsilon_{iv}$$

All of the variables, except G, aggregated from village level to the city/ district level by adjusting to 2 conditions, the number of population and the number of villages per city/ district. Where x_{iv} are vector of characteristics of social and public facilities in the city/district which aggregated on average per village, including the availability of social and civic institutions are active activity. While H_{hv} are vector of demographic characteristics in the city/district which aggregated on average per village, including the availability of the number of children of school age, the ratio of female-headed households. While G_v are Gini index in the city/district level and the mean income.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The following section is an analysis section that discusses the measurement of ulama's leadership quality variables and then proceed by entering this variable into the model. Furthermore, we would also discusses the factors that determine the completion of a conflict.

Descriptive Analysis

Table below presents the data that during the year 2011 in Indonesia have occurred as many as 3519 conflict. Of various types. Of that number, only 63 conflicts (around 1.8%) which can be reconciled by the religious leaders (ulama/toga).

Meanwhile compared to the role of informal leaders, namely, public figures, can reconcile conflicts as many as 637 events (18.1%). This means that public figures (toma) managed to reconcile the conflict 10 times more than the religious leaders.

Table 2. Total Incidence of Conflict and Could be Reconciled

By Informal Leaders; Community and Religious Leaders

	totriot	riotwarga	riotkamp	iotpmrntal	iotkemnan	riotpljar	riotsuku
happen	3519	1664	1087	109	136	224	128
toga	63	41	9	1	3	1	7
toma	637	377	181	9	11	22	7

Sorces : Authors' calculation from PODES 2011

Meanwhile, regardless of the scale and impact, refer to the types of conflicts and are successfully reconciled by both informal leaders, there are some interesting records that need attention.

First, the conflict between the residents is a type of conflict that dominates, 1664 or nearly 50% of the conflict events. While the conflict between citizens and government officials is the least conflict occurs, which is only 109 events (3.1%).

Second, the capacity of both informal leaders in reconciling the various types of

conflicts also different. Community leaders (toma) could reconcile 377 events of 1664 incidence of conflicts between residents (approximately 22.67%). Meanwhile, religious leaders (ulama/toga) can only reconcile 41 occurrence (approximately 2.5%). Furthermore, the types of conflicts among students and between citizens and government officials, religious leaders are only able to reconcile one of the 224 and 109 events (0.4% and 0.8%).

Third, exposure data description above is at least a preliminary description of the position and the potential role of informal leaders, especially religious leaders in mediating the conflict. If you look at the number and type of conflict that is able to be reconciled by any informal character, then the inter-ethnic conflict is a kind of conflict with the highest ratios were significantly able to be reconciled by religious leaders, that 7 of the 63 events (about 11%), compared with a figure that is able to be reconciled by society, i.e. 7 of 637 events (1.1%). Presumably it could be a specific field of religious leaders in the context of reducing conflict.

Econometric Analysis Basic Results

Informal Leadership happen without the power or authority of the supporting organizations. In the organization, informal leader in addition to formal leader. Where formal leaders use power and authority to achieve their goals, informal leaders exert his influence. Thus the leadership methods differ substantially between formal and informal leaders. The effectiveness of informal leaders in the organization seems to lie in their ability to skillfully use social networks (La Fasto, 2001).

This seemed to imply that on one special condition, people move seeking a common identity (polarization). This is where the real, social capital is like a double-edged knife. Social capital can be directed towards positive benefits but can also be misused for the purpose of "negative" (Lin, 2011). Especially when socio-economic conditions such as poverty and inequality in a community in the past is quite high, strong bonding social capital, rather than dampen inequality earlier but it can reproduce (divergence) poverty and inequality (Mogues, 2005).

Findings from empirical studies that focus on the heterogeneity of wealth, found a significant negative relationships with quality of religious leaders influence.

First, the greater the inequality income then has the potential to weaken the influence of the quality of religious leaders influence. Even the more control variables include into the model, the bigger the coefficient of this variable. Meanwhile, the negative sign of inequality which is found in the several types of conflict should be interpreted carefully. The negative sign of inequality are more relevant when it's viewed as a within-group inequality. In this case, the increase in within-group inequality will be followed by a weakening of cohesiveness in the group, which in turn lowers the intensity of the conflict, and the opposite is true.

Second, the increase in polarization reflecting the extent to which a population is clustered around a small number of distant poles, as well as an increase in ethnic

fractionalization (social polarization) which reflects the ethnic grouping, both of which play a role in promoting conflict in the regions of Indonesia, as expected by hypothesis. The study also found that the increase in inequality plays a role in triggering the conflict.

Third, Inequality and polarization are two different sizes of people, both in theory and practice (Esteban, 2008). Society could becomes more income polarized (polarization increase) but in the same time income inequality decrease. So, both of them may have different impact. Our data show that in this case, inequality and polarization move in the same direction. In other words, both of them have same impact on quality of religious leaders influence.

Several studies have shown that when inequalities interact with polarization would strengthen the level of quality of religious leaders influence and to diminish conflict when people split into two groups of equal size (Indra, 2015). According to Esteban dan Ray (2012), individuals might effectively be placing more weight on the group than they do on themselves. The reasonable interpretation for this case suggests that observed conflicts must have been successful in resolving the collective action problem, so that such conflicts might be associated with a high value of group cohesion.

Put another way, according Esteban et al. (2012), the importance of polarization and inequality, could together be interpreted, using the theory, as an indicator that within-group cohesion in the contribution of conflict resources is particularly high in situations of open conflict. Overall, the results are relevant

to the terminology of "greed" and "grievance" proposed by Collier and Hoeffler (2004). Here, "greed" corresponds to conflict over private goods (natural resources), while "grievance" would come under the rubric of public goods (political rights and freedoms, or religious dominance).

The findings also surprising that the impact of the existence of social institutions (organizations) actually lowers the level of quality level of local communities religious leaders. The greater the ratio of the number of social institutions in a city/district, the weaker the level of quality of religious leaders influence. This certainly raises a big question and a pretty perplexing, why did this happen?. Are this social institution compete with religious leaders in order to gain their social role (influence) among the local community ?.

Meanwhile, in the context of institutions in urban areas, social interaction is not intense and weak among the tenants/contracting (residential instability/high residential mobility) with other citizens, hamper the process of adoption and enforcement of norms of social control (Pratt and the Cullens, 2005). This can be seen from the relation variable of home-own (rumah) with religious leaders influence level in column (4) and (6) positive significantly. May be different as the majority ethnic inhabitants (contracting) the house was to have high moral standards, but the bottleneck (constraint) interaction force them not to engage in enforcement activities of social norms.

Not to forget, the high level of vulnerability of families proxied by proportion of households

headed by female, also weakens the influence of the quality of religious leaders. According to social disorganization theory, this pattern emerged from the burden of single parents, which impairs the ability of the parents to cooperate and as it consequences therefore will reduce the number of adults who are involved in the joint supervision of children.

Region Effect

Interestingly, social norms evolve and adapt over time through interaction between generations. For that reason, social norms differ between institutions, across cultures and across time. This gives some important implications for the role of social norms variation impact in the prevention of violation of norms or other anti-social activities in general. In this regard, in some institutional structure, through different mechanisms, social norms do not act optimally. Referring to the social disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay's, 1969), the institution heterogeneous in culture and ethnicity, competition between standards of social norms led to the institution failed to agree on social control. In another words, the community had a level of CE relatively lower.

Other findings are quite interesting in this context is the change of direction (sign) the relation of the proportion of the population living in urban areas with CE level. In the basic regression equation (annex 2) in column (1) and (2), the proportion of urban population affect the level of religious leaders influence is positive. But in the context of Java-outside Java, the relation becomes negative significantly. Presumably, the proportion of rural areas

with increasingly large on the island of Java quite influential in determining the level of religious leaders influence. Hall has become an attractive idea to examine further how the socio-economic structures that exist in rural areas can provide a positive variation in the formation of the religious leaders influence.

Affluent effect (Rich vs. Poor)

For residents in a relatively prosperous environment, which enjoy formal job, a good income, and sufficient time and resources to tackle local problems (e.g., delinquency), a mix of strong and weak ties will empower each other. Strong bond allows the citizens to reach a consensus on the problem together, agree on a promising solution, and work collectively to try these solutions. Weak bonds with the outside environment enabling them to introduce innovative solutions to provide fresh ideas and information.

Conversely in disadvantaged neighborhoods, high levels of residential mobility (residential mobility), poverty, and lack of time and resources weakens their ability to reach consensus on controlling criminality outside the kinship network, identifying new ways to control crime, linkages with other agencies and act collectively. Moreover, in such an environment, disadvantaged youth, who have high levels of drop-out (DO) high school and a dismal labor market, have a strong incentive to develop alternative ways to get the status, perhaps in a way that tend to breaking the social rules.

This is evident from a reading of regression results showed a significant positive relationship between the average (mean) household

expenditure with CE level. The higher average household expenditure in a city/district level, the greater the index. This relationship proved to be quite robust at 10% significance level. Proven in the model in column (6), the direction of the relationship between Kaya with the index has not changed. However, its significance so reduced, from 5% to 10%, with included a variety of additional control variables into the model.

CONCLUTION AND RECOMMENDATION

The main conclusion of this paper is that heterogeneity in communities socio-economic structure which proixed by polarization and inequality (of income), has negative effect on the quality of influence of religious leaders. This study found that those reduce religious leaders (toga) role in resolving conflict (mass brawl) at their community level significantly. In the process to arrive at this conclusion, we found more interesting results. Here are some of them. First, there is a quadratic pattern of the relationship between income inequality proxied by the Gini index to influence the quality of influence of informal leaders.

Second, the structure, the circumstances (context) other socioeconomic also proved a significant role in determining the quality of the influence of religious leaders. Or indirectly, cause a conflict can be resolved by informal leaders, especially religious leaders was not as simple as we think it is. To understand the dynamics of internal conflict many specific indicators need to be taken into account, such as poverty and high population growth, scarcity of resources, discrimination and powerlessness of minorities and other groups in society. Mix these variables can, but need not always, lead to social stress, violence and war.

Therefore it's important to distinguish between the structural causes of conflict and the proximate cause that triggered the escalation of the conflict. This is the reason why conflict prevention today should differentiate between short-term and structural prevention. Structural causes primarily include factors related to State weakness, poverty, political injustice and economic hardship. Thus, a structural preventive should have economic, human needs strong and government bias, and should consist of development assistance, local capacity building, and assistance in the selection and monitoring of human rights.

Third, polarization and inequality contribute significantly to the escalation of conflict, making the government should be acutely aware of the potential dangers arising from widening group-based alienation as well as strengthening in- group identification. According to the Between-Group Transfer axiom suggested by Foster and Wolfson (1992), one of the best ways to curb the strengthening of polarization is through redistribution of income (or wealth) from the rich to the poor. Redistribution of income (or wealth) are respectively the transfer of income (or wealth) from some individuals to others by means of a social mechanism such as taxation, monetary policies, welfare, land reform, charity, confiscation, divorce or tort law.

RESEARCH LIMITATION

This paper has several important deficiencies that must be addressed in a variety of advanced research.

First, forming the source exploration of the quality of religious leaders role is still very limited. This paper only take a mass brawl which resolved by religious leaders as the proxy for their influence (role) quality. This certainly requires further clarification to believe that indeed it is valid to represent the level of quality of religious leaders role.

Second, the positive impact of interaction between polarization and inequality with the quality of religious leaders role leaves the interesting question. How this could become and through what mechanism caused this fact ?. Uncertainty about these mechanisms raises questions with important policy implications. This is an important information that could be a conflict reduction policy instruments that can be intervened by the government.

Then also as usual social-themed research, the results of the regression estimation in a variety of models in this paper, suspected still contains many problems endogeneitas. In understanding the patterns and processes of causality, which is the cause and which the effect, within the scope of the social phenomenon that estimate free from bias, the accuracy and flying hours was crucial.

Of it, is expected to answer questions about how important the prevention of anti-conflict through a program which includes strengthening religious leaders in the community, in times of extreme such as the increasingly rising income inequality? To what extent that public authorities should be concerned with income and class polarization?.

Hopefully, this small and simple paper will help generate interest in the issues and can answer most questions related to community-based crime prevention.

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